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INTRODUCTION 
Like the U.S. Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“the Convention”) guarantees both the right to a fair trial and the right to the 
assistance of counsel. The right to counsel has many dimensions, including 
a state’s obligation to provide counsel to indigents, limits on state 
interference with counsel, a definition of the stages at which counsel’s 
assistance is required, and standards for the competency of counsel. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has grappled with each of these dimensions, and right to 
counsel cases are beginning to reach the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”). For instance, there are strong parallels between the ECtHR’s 
decision in Salduz v. Turkey1 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona.2 Both decisions found that the trial court violated the 
right to legal assistance and a fair trial by admitting a defendant’s statement 
made in police custody in the absence of a lawyer.3 
This paper offers a comparative exploration of the enforcement of the 
right to counsel for indigent defendants in the United States of America and 
the member states of the Council of Europe, with a special focus on the 
structures established by the U.S. Constitution and the Convention. We ask 
the following questions: What roles do the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
ECtHR play as central courts in enforcing the right to counsel in the 
sovereign states from which they hear cases? What mechanisms exist to 
enforce the courts’ pronouncements? And to what extent has the evolution 
of the right to counsel in each system been path dependent? 
Although some version of a right to counsel has existed in the United 
States for more than two centuries,4 the U.S. Constitution does not 
specifically address the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings, and 
the states have never explicitly agreed to a federal mandate providing 
counsel in criminal cases.5 In fact, the federal constitutional right to the 
 
 1.  Salduz v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 59. 
 2.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 3.  Id. at 444–45; Salduz, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 83. Note, however, that the Miranda decision 
grounded the right to counsel during custodial interrogation in the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 4.  The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, guaranteed criminal defendants in federal trials “the 
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for [their] defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5.  Note, however, that there may be state constitutional rights to government-compensated 
counsel. Some state constitutions address the matter explicitly in the text. The Louisiana Constitution 
provides:  
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assistance of state-provided counsel was not articulated by the Supreme 
Court until the 1960s.6 It was founded on the general guarantee of Due 
Process first made applicable to the states in 1868 at the conclusion of the 
Civil War.7 Perhaps this institutional history helps to explain why the right, 
though widely recognized as a critical part of the United States’ adversarial 
legal system, has remained more of an ideal than a reality for many American 
defendants. Criminal defense lawyers are both expensive and controversial, 
and there has been no consistent political support for adequately funding 
indigent defense.8 Many indigent defendants find themselves represented by 
attorneys whose caseloads make effective representation impossible, and 
U.S. courts lack the institutional tools to provide this funding.9 
In contrast, the recognition of a European right10 to state-compensated 
defense counsel is more recent, and also more explicit. It is the product of a 
post-World War II international agreement that specifically guarantees a 
publicly-funded right to counsel.11 The Convention that created the ECtHR 
also established an enforcement mechanism that has been strengthened by 
subsequent revision of the Convention, decisions of the ECtHR, and the 
 
At each stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, 
or appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by 
imprisonment. The legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and 
compensating qualified counsel for indigents. 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 13. In other states, the state supreme court has interpreted the state constitution to 
provide a right to adequate state-provided counsel. See also Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 
(1971) (holding that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a 
conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had 
due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.”).  
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  See infra text accompanying note 50. 
 8.  See infra Part II.B.4. 
 9.  See infra Part II.B.1–3. 
 10.  The Criminal Procedure codes of various European states provided for a right to counsel long 
before the European Convention came into force. See, e.g., STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] sec. 137(1) (Ger.): “The suspect/defendant may make use of the assistance of a 
defense lawyer at any stage of the proceedings.” An English language translation of the German Code 





 11.  See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights) art. 6, ¶ (3)(c), Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that anyone 
charged with a criminal offense has the right “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of 
his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when 
the interests of justice so require”).  
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development of detailed administrative enforcement procedures that now 
comprise the Strasbourg supervisory system.12 
Although many U.S. scholars are skeptical of the efficacy of 
international human rights treaties and courts,13 the Strasbourg system 
created by the European Convention appears to offer several advantages over 
the U.S. constitutional system, which has been plagued by the twin problems 
of a lack of political will to provide sufficient funding for counsel and courts’ 
inability to address systemic, rather than individual, problems.14 The 
Convention reflects the explicit—and relatively recent—political 
commitment of each member state to publicly-funded counsel. And by 
placing the responsibility for implementation of the ECtHR’s decisions in 
the hands of a political body, the Committee of Ministers (“CoM”), the 
Convention addresses—at least to some degree—the question of political 
will. Moreover, the CoM and the Court itself have now developed a 
repertoire of enforcement mechanisms that require member states to adopt 
general or systemic remedies. 
But despite the apparent promise of this institutional design and the 
judicial and administrative developments we describe below, there are still 
severe limits to what the ECtHR can accomplish. It has limited resources to 
deal with a massive caseload15 and ultimately lacks the means to compel 
recalcitrant member states to comply with the Convention short of expulsion 
from the Council of Europe. Indeed member states themselves retain the 
option of exiting from the Convention and the Council of Europe.16 In 
contrast, after the seceding states lost the United States Civil War, the 
Supreme Court held that the union was “indissoluble;” the states had no right 
of exit.17 
 
 12.  See infra Part III.B. The term Strasbourg refers to the location of the ECtHR in Strasbourg, 
France, and the “Strasbourg system” refers to the collection of decisions by the Court combined with 
decisions by the Committee of Ministers. 
 13.  For a trenchant statement of this view, see generally ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). 
 14.  See infra Part II.B. 
 15.  See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 16.  Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 7, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 108. Greece withdrew 
from the Council of Europe in 1970, but it was readmitted in 1974 following a change in regime. See 
STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FULL LIST: CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF 
TREATY 001, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/001/signatures? 
p_auth=O0WvDEB0 [https://perma.cc/6FT2-YR64] at n. 12 (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). Russia has 
reportedly considered withdrawing. See, e.g., Ivan Nechepurenko, Council of Europe Exit to Cut Russia 
Away From Europe, THE MOSCOW TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 8:38 PM), https://themoscowti 
mes.com/news/council-of-europe-exit-to-cut-russia-away-from-europe-43568 [https://perma.cc/3TDN-
KZGS]. 
 17.  See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700 (1869) (holding that the Constitution did not permit states 
to unilaterally secede from the United States). 
BEALE  MYERS - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2016  10:33 PM 
2016] THE CONSTITUTION V. THE CONVENTION 5 
We begin by contrasting the founding documents of the United States 
and the Council of Europe. We then turn to a more detailed description of 
each system’s current enforcement mechanisms and the outcomes for 
defendants in the United States and Europe in relation to the state-funded 
right to counsel. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONVENTION 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution did not focus directly on the 
protection of individual rights, and the Constitution contained no provisions 
requiring either the states or the new central government to provide counsel, 
or even to afford individual defendants Due Process or a fair trial. Rather, 
the framers relied on structural limitations to protect individual liberty by 
limiting the power delegated to the new federal government and creating an 
internal system of checks and balances.18 As adopted by the Constitutional 
Convention, the proposed U.S. Constitution created the federal government; 
divided its powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches;19 
it also delegated to the new government only authority over enumerated 
matters of national concern such as foreign affairs, the establishment of a 
postal service, and the regulation of land, naval forces, and commerce.20 The 
proposed Constitution vested all judicial power in the Supreme Court and 
any lower federal courts that Congress chose to create.21 The Constitution 
contained no guarantees of personal rights or freedoms, and indeed this 
omission was one of the principal grounds of opposition to ratification.22 The 
first ten amendments (known as the “Bill of Rights”) were added later to 
address this concern and secure ratification.23 The Bill of Rights includes the 
well-known rights to freedom of speech and religion, Due Process, and the 
 
 18.  See William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 1343, 1346 (1987) (discussing the framers’ approach to protecting individual liberty).  
 19.  U.S. CONST. art. I (legislative), art. II (executive), and art. III (judicial). 
 20.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (interstate and foreign commerce), art. I, § 8, cl. 12–14 (raising 
and supporting armies, providing and maintaining a navy, and making rules for land and naval forces, 
respectively), art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 (President is the Commander-in-Chief and has power to make treaties 
provided that two-thirds of Senate concurs). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 22.  See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 
353–54 (1998). The text did contain one provision that is understood to be a personal right. Article III, 
Section 2 included the right to a trial by jury. Justice Scalia called this limitation on the judiciary “the 
spinal column of American democracy,” as opposed to the “Johnny-come-lately” constitutional rights, 
like the right to counsel, which were added to the Constitution through the Bill of Rights. Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 23.  See Bogus, supra note 22, at 353–54 (explaining that Virginia, the last state to ratify the 
Constitution, did not do so until after delegates to the state’s constitutional convention had been assured 
that the creation of a bill of rights would follow ratification).  
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right to the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings.24 But the right to 
the assistance of counsel in the Bill of Rights applied only to the nascent 
federal government, not to the States, and it did not guarantee attorneys for 
defendants who could not afford them. The Sixth Amendment simply 
allowed defendants to retain and use private counsel in federal criminal 
prosecutions.25 
The mechanisms to enforce decisions of the Supreme Court in criminal 
cases have evolved over the past 200 years, expanding significantly but also 
generating countervailing federalism constraints. In the Judiciary Act of 
1789,26 Congress created the lower federal courts. Although initially limited 
to matters such as suits in admiralty and actions involving citizens of 
different states or subjects of foreign nations, the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts was later expanded to provide a forum for claims arising under 
the federal constitution.27 The Judiciary Act also provided that the new 
federal courts had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus.28 Following the 
Civil War, the Constitution for the first time required the states to provide 
Due Process of law and to extend the privileges and immunities of federal 
citizenship to all Americans.29 At that time, Congress also extended the writ 
of habeas corpus to state cases,30 though the scope of review was initially 
understood to be very narrow.31 These developments set the stage for the 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts to review individual state 
convictions for federal constitutional error32 either upon direct review of the 
 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, VI. 
 25.  See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2013). 
 26.  Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, §§ 2–3. 
 27.  See generally Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the 
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421. 
 28.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 14. Article I of the Constitution provides that 
Congress may not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment also gave Congress the authority 
to pass legislation to enforce those rights through its enforcement clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
In 1979, Congress enacted legislation providing a civil cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 30.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 1197 (7th ed. 2015) (calling the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 the “most significant expansion of 
the writ”); see also BRIAN R. MEANS, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS: A PRIMER ON COLLATERAL 
REVIEW 28 (2015). 
 31.  This initial legislative expansion of the writ for state prisoners could only be used to challenge 
the state court’s jurisdiction in the matter and was not an available avenue to challenge other elements of 
the prisoner’s detention. MEANS, supra note 30, at 28. 
 32.  The Court formally recognized this power in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485–87 (1953). In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted that, “the prior State determination of a claim under the 
United States Constitution cannot foreclose [a federal court’s] consideration of such a claim, else the 
State court would have the final say, which the Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not 
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conviction in the Supreme Court or in a habeas action initiated in federal 
district court.33 With nearly 700 federal court judges currently on the bench,34 
these developments allow defendants to seek habeas corpus relief in local 
courts that have the time and capacity to hear their cases. Upon a finding of 
such a constitutional error, the federal court can—depending on the 
procedure used to seek review—reverse a state conviction or order a state 
prisoner’s release.35 
The enforcement of the right to counsel in Europe reflects the very 
different history, purpose, and structure of the Council of Europe and the 
Convention. The Council of Europe was created following World War II, as 
Europe recovered from atrocities and widespread human rights abuses and 
responded to the beginning of the Cold War.36 The Council’s core purposes 
are more narrowly defined than those of the United States government or the 
European Union.37 From its inception in 1949,38 the Council identified the 
protection of rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms as among 
 
have.” Id. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Even at this point, however, the justices remained anxious 
about disrupting the balance between federal and state courts. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that “a 
casual, unrestricted opening of the doors of the federal courts to these claims not only would cast an undue 
burden upon those courts, but would also disregard our duty to support and not weaken the sturdy 
enforcement of their criminal laws by the States.” Id. at 498.  
 33.  The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to review judgments of the 
highest state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (reviewing for claim of right, privilege, or immunity under 
the Constitution). The district courts have jurisdiction to entertain applications by state prisoners for a 
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 34.  U.S. COURTS, Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - District Courts, http://www. 
uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-history-authorized-judgeships-
district-courts [https://perma.cc/GZ3R-QMYK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (listing 667 district judges). 
 35.  If a case reaches the Supreme Court on certiorari from the state judgment of conviction, the 
Court may hold that the conviction is invalid. But the Supreme Court hears fewer than 100 cases per year, 
and accordingly the vast majority of state convictions are challenged in habeas actions in the federal 
district court. As a technical matter, a habeas action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
is a civil action challenging the legality of the prisoner’s detention. If the court finds a constitutional 
defect in the conviction, the prisoner’s detention is unlawful, and the remedy is to order the state to release 
the defendant or retry him within a specified period of time. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33391, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW (2006). 
 36.  A full account of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, but another author has 
discussed the ebb and flow of the ECtHR’s authority and legitimacy. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, 
The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy 
to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2016).  
 37.  The Council of Europe is not a “government” in the conventional sense. It consists of 
representatives of the member states and has only the limited function assigned to it by the treaty. 
 38.  The Council of Europe was founded on May 5, 1949, by the Treaty of London (or Statute of 
the Council of Europe), which was signed on that day by ten states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Statute of the Council 
of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/con 
ventions/rms/0900001680306052 [https://perma.cc/3S54-YCAK]. 
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its principle functions.39 Those purposes were implemented by the adoption 
in 1950 of the European Convention on Human Rights,40 to which all forty-
seven members of the Council are now signatories.41 Human rights are the 
exclusive subject of the Convention, which defined the protected rights and 
created a court to adjudicate them (but no system of subsidiary human rights 
courts). Finally, the Convention provided—without further amplification—
that the Committee of Ministers would supervise the execution of the Court’s 
judgments. Although the initial cost of ratifying the Convention was low, 
because it did not require member states to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR or provide for individual petitions, all major states later accepted 
these now compulsory features.42 
From this rudimentary beginning, the Convention’s enforcement 
mechanisms have been developed and strengthened by amendments to the 
Convention,43 the development of detailed administrative procedures,44 and 
further actions of the ECtHR as well as other organs of the Council of 
Europe.45 And in recent years, the European Union has adopted measures 
that are based in part on the same principles underlying the ECtHR’s 
judgments protecting human rights, including the right to counsel.46 
II.  ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The U.S. constitutional right to counsel, as it is now understood, 
subjects the states to federal oversight. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,47 
 
 39.  In the preamble, the signatories reaffirmed “their devotion to the spiritual and moral values 
which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty 
and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy.” Id. Article 3 stated that 
“[e]very member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the 
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim . . . .” Id. 
 40.  See supra note 11. 
 41.  A list of the 47 signatories may be found at Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUROPE TREATY OFFICE, http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=1&DF=14/05/2015&CL=ENG 
[https://perma.cc/77GU-G8AM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
 42.  See Madsen, supra note 36.  
 43.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 44.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 45.  See infra Part III.B.3–4. 
 46.  See infra Part III.C. See Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings and in European Arrest 
Warrant Proceedings, and on the Right to Have a Third Party Informed upon Deprivation of Liberty and 
to Communicate with Third Persons and with Consular Authorities while Deprived of Liberty, 2013 O.J. 
(L 294) 1 (EC). 
 47.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
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state convictions are invalid if they do not meet the standards of the federal 
Constitution.48 However, as noted, the right to counsel was not a part of the 
original design of the U.S. Constitution. The current positive right to the 
assistance of government-paid counsel developed as a result of significant 
changes to both the text of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the text.49 In the 1860s, following the U.S. Civil War, the 
Constitution was amended to impose new restrictions on states, including the 
requirement that they not deprive any person of life or liberty without Due 
Process of law.50 A century later, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court read Due 
Process to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights—including the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel—against the states.51 In the landmark case of 
Gideon v. Wainwright,52 the Court held that a right to state-compensated 
counsel was implicit in the general requirement of Due Process.53 Then, for 
the first time, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts54 were faced 
with the task of enforcing the Court’s right to counsel precedents in state 
proceedings. 
In the following section, we describe how the right to counsel has been 
interpreted within the constraints of the American political system. 
A.  Due Process as a Basis for the Right to Counsel 
1.  The Right to Publicly-Compensated Counsel in a Criminal Case 
In Gideon, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment imposes 
an affirmative duty on the states to provide publicly-compensated counsel to 
indigent defendants in any case where the defendant upon conviction might 
 
 48.  See infra note 54. State courts are also obliged by the Supremacy Clause to apply federal 
constitutional standards. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 49.  We draw the discussion in this section, in part, from earlier work on this topic by one of us. See 
generally Richard E. Myers II, Adversarial Counsel in an Inquisitorial System, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 411 (2011). 
 50.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 51.  See generally, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the protection 
against double jeopardy); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the right to a 
speedy trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the protection against self-
incrimination).  
 52.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 53.  Id. at 341–44. 
 54.  There are two avenues for federal review of state criminal convictions. A defendant whose 
conviction is affirmed by the state court on direct appeal may seek discretionary review by a petition for 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. If the defendant’s appeal is unsuccessful, he may bring a separate 
collateral attack (commonly referred to as habeas proceedings), which is filed in federal district court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An adverse decision in the habeas proceeding may be appealed to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals, and certiorari may again be sought in the Supreme Court. 
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be incarcerated.55 The Court reasoned that “in our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This 
seems to us to be an obvious truth.”56 The Court subsequently ruled that the 
right to state-funded counsel is applicable not only at trial, but also at any 
critical stage after the commencement of adversarial proceedings.57 It also 
held that defendants have the right to the “effective” assistance of counsel.58 
Finally, in its famous Miranda59 ruling, the Court held that a defendant 
subject to custodial interrogation must be informed that he has a right to 
consult counsel and that if he cannot afford counsel one will be provided for 
him.60 
2.  The Test for the Adequacy of Counsel 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee indigent defendants access to excellent lawyers or an error-free 
defense. As long as counsel is sufficiently competent to ensure that the 
judicial process was adversarial in nature, the constitutional standard has 
been met.61 The Court has also held that representation should not be ruled 
ineffective unless “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”62 
In general,63 the Supreme Court has held that ineffectiveness is to be 
judged by a two-pronged test.64 First, the attorney’s performance must be 
deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, 
 
 55.  See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. 
 56.  Id. at 344. 
 57.  See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970). 
 58.  Id. at 7. 
 59.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 60.  Id. at 467. Note, however, that Miranda’s holding on the right to counsel was grounded on the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination rather than the Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, because adversarial proceedings had not yet commenced.  
 61.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (“The right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted—even if 
defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors—the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth 
Amendment has occurred.”). 
 62.  United States v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
 63.  There are a limited number of circumstances where the prejudicial effect required in the second 
prong will be presumed—the complete denial of counsel, counsel’s refusal to participate, and perhaps 
cases where there is an unwaived conflict of interest that would so substantially interfere with counsel’s 
ability to act as an advocate that he would be deemed not to have participated. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (5th ed. 2009).  
 64.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
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counsel’s failure must have prejudiced the defendant.65 To demonstrate 
prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the case might have been different absent the deficient performance. In 
applying this test, defense counsel must be given wide latitude to represent 
the defendant, and judicial scrutiny must be “highly deferential.”66 
The combined effect of these rulings is that a defense attorney who 
barely passes the minimal threshold of competence meets the Sixth 
Amendment standard, as long as the attorney was allowed to contest the 
prosecution’s case and in fact did so. Although federal courts found 
violations of the right to counsel in a limited number of instances where a 
defendant was systematically deprived of defense counsel,67 for the most part 
the courts have found ineffectiveness only when the actions of counsel were 
so deficient as to reduce the trial to a “mockery of justice.”68 
3.  The Reality of the Right to Counsel 
Many indigent defendants in the United States are represented by 
attorneys who are demonstrably ineffective, and insufficient funding is 
directly related to inadequacy of representation.69 Because public defense 
systems in most states are chronically underfunded,70 defenders must 
represent their clients with only a fraction of the time and resources required 
to do their job well.71 As the Right to Counsel Committee stated: 
Frequently, public defenders are asked to represent far too many clients. 
Sometimes the defenders have well over 100 clients at a time, with many 
clients charged with serious offenses, and their cases moving quickly 
through the court system. As a consequence, defense lawyers are 
constantly forced to violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 689. The Court declined to establish specific requirements that counsel must meet, stating: 
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding 
how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the 
constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must 
have in making tactical decisions. 
Id. at 688–89. 
 67.  See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 169 (2d ed. 2005). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT 
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009) [hereinafter RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE]. 
 70.  To illustrate, consider the funding scheme in Louisiana, where close to 70% of the budget for 
public defenders comes from minor court fees of $45 each, creating a system that inevitably prohibits 
defenders from spending sufficient time with their clients. Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485 
165/ [https://perma.cc/TJ4D-QN7D]. 
 71.  See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but 
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844–49 (1994). 
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make it impossible for them to practice law as they are required to do 
according to the profession’s rules. They cannot interview their clients 
properly, effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, 
conduct necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with the 
prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other 
tasks that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time 
and resources.72 
Critics have called the current state of indigent defense a tragedy73 and 
a “national disgrace.”74 The system, they argue, is one-sided, and it 
substitutes expediency for accuracy, and economy for justice. 
B.  Barriers to Enforcement 
Constitutional rights should be enforced without regard to the public 
appetite for such enforcement, but there are structural, constitutional, and 
political reasons why the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have 
not taken more steps to enforce the constitutional guarantee of access to 
effective counsel. 
1.  The Limitations Imposed by Federalism 
The federal courts do not have a general supervisory power over state 
courts in the United States, and federalism limits the federal courts’ role in 
constitutional enforcement. Although the Supreme Court has binding 
authority over state courts on constitutional questions, each of the fifty states 
is a separate sovereign in the U.S. structure. National power exists only to 
the extent that the states have delegated such power to the national 
government under a constitutional provision.75 Federalism concerns have led 
the federal courts to construe narrowly both the right to counsel and the scope 
of federal judicial review. The limitations on federal judicial review have 
 
 72.  See RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, supra note 69, at 7. 
 73. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 968 (2004) 
(stating “grossly incompetent lawyers whom none of us would trust with traffic offenses are being 
entrusted with the lives and liberty of indigent defendants”); Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of 
Gideon: Providing High-Quality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 713 (2013) 
(calling indigent defense “the proverbial neglected child in the justice system”);. see generally, e.g., Mary 
Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1031 (2006) (describing multiple instances in which innocent defendants languished in jail without 
the ability to even contact a public defender). 
 74.  Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 894 
(2009); see also Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 625 (1986).  
 75.  The emphasis Supreme Court justices place on the concept of delegated powers varies. Strict 
constructionists treat it as a significant limitation, while others have been more willing to expand the 
Court’s power to enforce a flexible, “living constitution.” See generally, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The 
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).  
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affected both individual relief—particularly habeas corpus for state 
prisoners—as well as more sweeping remedies. 
Although the scope of review available in habeas corpus actions 
expanded in the 1960s, beginning in the 1970s federalism concerns led the 
courts and Congress to retrench and severely limit judicial review of state 
convictions. In a series of 1960s decisions, the Supreme Court allowed state 
prisoners to challenge the constitutionality of their detention.76 This seemed 
to lay the groundwork for a requirement that the states provide fully effective 
counsel.77 But within a decade the Supreme Court cut back on the scope of 
post-conviction judicial review in response to countervailing federalism 
concerns,78 and in the 1990s Congress further restricted habeas relief.79 
Similarly, the principles of federalism pose a substantial barrier to 
federal courts ordering any state to engage in deep structural reform. 
Requiring a more fully-realized right to counsel would force state 
legislatures to engage in massive spending. As the bipartisan National Right 
to Counsel Committee notes: “Taken together, the Court’s historic rulings, 
based upon the federal Constitution’s Sixth Amendment counsel provision, 
are a significant, high-cost, unfunded mandate imposed upon state and/or 
local governments.”80 State budget crises across the nation81 make it 
particularly unpopular for courts to order the level of spending that the 
commitment requires.82 
 
 76.  See generally, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).  
 77.  Indeed, habeas review of state court criminal proceedings reached its “high water mark” in the 
1960s under Chief Justice Earl Warren. See MEANS, supra note 30, at 34. For example, in Townsend v. 
Sain, the Court held that the federal courts could not only review the findings of law made by state courts, 
but they could also review findings of fact and order evidentiary hearings to uncover underlying facts. 
372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). 
 78.  See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (establishing a more stringent 
standard of reviewing constitutional violations for a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict as 
opposed to a harmless error standard); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (“[W]here the State has 
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does 
not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”); see generally MEANS, 
supra note 30, at 37. 
 79.  See MEANS, supra note 30, at 40 (discussing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, which Congress passed following the bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building amid 
concerns that federal habeas petitions hindered a swift response to such crimes); see generally FALLON, 
supra note 30, at 1198.  
 80.  RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, supra note 69, at 29–30. 
 81.  Tracy Gordon, State and Local Finance: Where We’re Going, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
(Jan. 31, 2011) (“U.S. state governments are facing budgetary shortfalls that threaten important public 
services and state employee pensions. From New York to Texas to California, states across the country 
must deal with revenue and spending imbalances, forcing governments to make hard choices on how to 
meet basic needs.”).  
 82.  In fact, in the budget passed by the Louisiana state legislature for 2017, the funding for public 
BEALE  MYERS - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2016  10:33 PM 
14 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 27:1 
2.  The Case or Controversy Limitation 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal courts to hear 
cases related to specific “cases” or “controversies.”83 As a result, remedies 
for violations of the right to counsel are administered by the courts on an ad 
hoc basis. Remedies usually take the form of conviction reversals or habeas 
relief, both of which apply only to the defendant in the case at bar. Even if a 
court recognizes that the violation of an individual defendant’s right to 
counsel is part of a systemic problem, it will not ordinarily order a remedy 
beyond the reversal of that defendant’s conviction. 
What would it take to overcome the case or controversy limitation? It 
depends on whom you ask. Some scholars suggest that the federal courts 
would actually be exceeding their power to order relief unless they could 
establish that an actual violation occurred.84 Other commentators believe that 
the federal courts have artificially limited class-action access to injunctive 
relief through abstention doctrines.85 
Could a defendant prosecuted in state court persuade a federal court to 
issue an order enforcing the right to effective counsel for himself and all 
other similarly situated defendants if he could demonstrate that the state 
public defenders are so overworked that they cannot properly investigate and 
try cases, and that the lack of funding for experts and investigators 
necessitates triage among defendants? As the law now stands, such an order 
seems unlikely. The federal courts have been reluctant to enforce the right to 
counsel through injunctive relief. Instead, the courts have refused to hear 
such cases, invoking so-called Younger abstention to avoid the issue.86 In 
Younger v. Harris,87 the Supreme Court held that the lower federal courts 
should avoid hearing cases that unduly interfere with the legitimate activities 
of state courts. In cases involving access to counsel, the Younger doctrine 
usually means that the federal courts will not interfere until an individual 
 
defenders was cut by 62%. See Walsh, supra note 70.  
 83.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 84.  See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 453–55 (2009) (noting the “proposition that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief 
in federal court must assert an ongoing violation or one that is likely to occur again in the future.” (citing 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 96 (1983))). 
 85.  See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense 
Crisis, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 4–5 (Sept. 2010). 
 86.  See generally Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). The case that suggested the 
most promise for a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) lawsuit was Luckey v. Harris, where the court 
recognized that prospective relief in a civil suit required a different standard than an ineffective assistance 
claim under Strickland and Cronic, but ultimately dismissed the case on abstention grounds. 860 F.2d 
1012 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 87.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). 
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defendant has exhausted all possible remedies under state law.88 As a result, 
structural reform litigation challenging the adequacy of indigent defense 
systems has seen little success in federal courts,89 although there have been 
changes in several states attributed to settlements or consent decrees.90 
3.  The Limitations of Institutional Reform Litigation 
Structural reform litigation also generates concerns about the 
institutional capacity of the federal courts and the related question of whether 
such judicial reforms can be effective. These concerns are heightened when 
state institutions are involved. Criminal justice reform also raises special 
concerns about public safety. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata91 provides a vivid 
example of the interaction of these concerns. The decision in Brown to 
require California to dramatically reduce its prison population deeply 
divided the Court. Critics questioned the legitimacy of the Court’s action,92 
and it remains uncertain how effective the Court’s ruling has been. A 
majority of the Court accepted the lower court’s finding that California’s 
grossly overloaded prison medical system was causing needless fatalities 
among inmates and was “broken beyond repair.”93 Accordingly, the majority 
upheld the lower court’s order requiring California to reduce its prison 
population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years.94 The ruling 
prompted two passionate dissents. Justice Scalia characterized the order as 
“the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an 
 
 88.  See Primus, supra note 85, at 4–5 (“Federal courts have relied on abstention doctrine to refuse 
to hear federal civil rights cases that allege systemic right-to-counsel violations.”). 
 89.  See Drinan, supra note 84, at 468. 
 90.  See id. at 443–62 (describing more successful “second generation” indigent defense litigation); 
Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2701–04 (2013) 
(discussing litigation in Florida, Virginia, Massachusetts, Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania and 
Connecticut) (“[T]he wide differences among jurisdictions along many dimensions—including the nature 
and extent of their indigent defense problems, their local politics, the insulation of their courts from 
political pressures, and the availability of potential allies—mean that there can be no one model for 
successful structural litigation. But the experience of the varied jurisdictions that have achieved some 
substantial steps forward in this way suggests that structural litigation has potential . . . to generate the 
political will to promote indigent defense reform.”); Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon: 
Providing High-Quality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 741 (2013) (discussing 
generally successful litigation in Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, 
and Washington, but noting the cases take years to complete and longer to implement any remedies). 
 91.  Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 493 (2011). 
 92.  See, e.g., Hans Bader, Supreme Court Upholds Radical Court Ruling Releasing Thousands of 
California Prisoners, WASH. EXAMINER (May 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ 
supreme-court-upholds-radical-court-ruling-releasing-thousands-of-california-prisoners/article/145491 
[https://perma.cc/8JXY-QSJ2]. 
 93.  Brown, 563 U.S. at 507. 
 94.  Id. at 541. 
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order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 
convicted criminals,” and stated that “the institutional reform the District 
Court has undertaken . . . ignores bedrock limitations on the power of Article 
III judges, and takes federal courts wildly beyond their institutional 
capacity.”95 Justice Alito emphasized that “[t]he Constitution does not give 
federal judges the authority to run state penal systems. Decisions regarding 
state prisons have profound public safety and financial implications, and the 
States are generally free to make these decisions as they choose.”96 
Moreover, five years after the decision, it is unclear whether the Court’s 
mandate has been effective. Although there was an initial reduction in 
overcrowding when state prisoners were moved to local jails—which may 
themselves have become overcrowded—progress stalled, and the state 
sought multiple extensions that some considered nothing more than a delay 
tactic.97 
Similar questions have been raised about other forms of institutional 
reform litigation, such as public school desegregation, another area in which 
the federal judiciary imposed unfunded mandates on states. The Supreme 
Court ordered the desegregation of public schools in Brown v. Board of 
Education,98 one of the most-heralded decisions in its history. But the 
decision had little immediate impact, particularly in the Jim Crow South, 
until Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964.99 A wave of lawsuits 
designed to desegregate southern public schools followed. Even with 
congressional action, long-lasting change has been elusive.100 In the 1960s 
and 1970s, factors like racially segregated neighborhoods and “white flight” 
made desegregation difficult to enforce.101 Now, even districts that had once 
been relatively integrated are seeing racial disparities in schools rise.102 
 
 95.  Id. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 96.  Id. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 97.  See Lawrence K. Karlton, Prison Litigation and District Court’s Effect on the Electoral 
Process, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 383 (2015) (noting that the court denied California’s request for 
adjustments of the prisoner population reduction target in 2012 and 2013, and later granted a two-year 
extension on the condition that the state bring no more appeals). 
 98.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 99.  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2004); see generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (concluding that in the absence of 
action by Congress and the executive branch, U.S. courts were unsuccessful in desegregating schools, 
and more generally that courts have very limited means to bring about social change). 
 100.  See Cowan v. Bolivar Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-CV-31-DMB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
63480, at *157 (N.D. Miss. May 13, 2016) (requiring a school district that had avoided integration in the 
fifty years since Brown v. Board to consolidate its schools to remedy the unconstitutional segregation of 
its students).  
 101.  Sabel & Simon, supra note 99, at 1023. 
 102.  See generally Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating 
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Despite the promise of Brown, “[s]ince the late 1970s, a sense of fatigue and 
futility has hung over large-scale desegregation efforts.”103 
4.  The Interaction of Legal and Political Barriers 
The underlying problem in enforcing a robust right to state-funded 
counsel is political: criminal defendants are a constituency without a 
champion. Barry Scheck explains the problem: 
[I]ndigent defense remains the neglected stepchild of the criminal justice 
system. It lacks a natural base, a core constituency with legislative 
influence—poor people charged with crimes, often disenfranchised by 
criminal convictions, and disproportionately from racial minorities, have 
limited political power in the first place. And there is a vicious cycle at 
work as well—the worse the representation of institutional defenders and 
court-appointed counsel, the less the community wants to rally for a larger 
defender budget or higher counsel fees.104 
Thus the problem is one of political will, especially in a time of 
competing claims for limited government resources.105 Lawyers are 
expensive, and the level of defense funding required to meet the demands of 
the most outspoken critics would be massive. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions can be seen as a response to this 
political reality. As Darryl Brown put it, “Strickland represents the 
[Supreme] Court’s acquiescence to a widespread legislative judgment 
against the institutionalization of zealous defense counsel.”106 Moreover, 
since the problems in right to counsel cases arise principally in state—not 
federal—prosecutions, the federal courts are limited by principles of 
federalism. Congress may have the constitutional authority to pass a national 
right to counsel law,107 but it has not done so. 
III.  ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN EUROPE 
The right to counsel developed very differently in Europe than in the 
United States. In the United States, the right to state-compensated counsel 
 
Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South 1990–2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563 (2003). 
 103.  Sabel & Simon, supra note 99, at 1023. 
 104.  Barry Scheck, Four Reforms for the Twenty-First Century, 96 JUDICATURE 323, 324 (May–
June 2013) (footnotes omitted). 
 105.  Carol Steiker states the problem this way: “With clamoring demand for dwindling public funds 
for schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, public transportation, firefighters, and police officers, it is not 
surprising that more money for lawyers representing alleged criminals is not high on anyone’s list. 
Generating the will to provide these crucial resources is an enormous challenge.” Steiker, supra note 90, 
at 2700. 
 106.  Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1604 (2005).  
 107.  See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s 
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 489 (2010). 
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was extended to state prosecutions long after adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution, and it has since been severely limited by the judiciary’s 
inability (or unwillingness) to impose systemic reforms on the states. Despite 
formal recognition of the right, resource constraints have crippled the 
representation of indigent defendants in state prosecutions, and the courts 
repeatedly face serious questions about the sufficiency of that representation, 
its limitations, and its requirements. As a practical matter, the right to counsel 
has been a hollow promise: most indigent defendants do not receive truly 
effective representation. On the other hand, an independent European right 
to counsel was created only sixty-five years ago by a treaty that explicitly 
guaranteed state-funded counsel, and this understanding of the right was 
ratified by each of the Council of Europe’s member states. Although initially 
there were few methods to enforce the judgments of the ECtHR, multiple 
enforcement mechanisms have been developed over the last few decades. 
Both the Court itself and the Committee of Ministers (“CoM”), the Council 
of Europe’s decision-making body,108 have expanded their repertoire of 
enforcement mechanisms, which now make up the modern Strasbourg 
supervisory system. The Court’s judgments now include not only specific 
remedies for individual claimants, but also general remedies mandating 
systemic change.109 Further, the CoM now asserts the authority to instruct 
member states to develop general, forward-looking remedies for violations 
of rights, assuring that systemic problems are addressed.110 The CoM can 
make recommendations as to how states should safeguard rights, particularly 
when a single member state is repeatedly the source of cases before the 
Court. Other Council of Europe organs, including the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Commissioner for Human Rights, can also exert pressure 
on noncompliant states.111 In addition to the Council of Europe, the European 
Union—an independent body with overlapping membership—has created 
further pressure for states to recognize the right to counsel with a directive 
instructing its member states to provide suspects with access to an 
attorney.112 
Although these changes in the Strasbourg supervisory system (and the 
EU directives) lay the groundwork for more robust implementation of the 
right to counsel in Europe than in the United States, the responses of member 
states to the Court’s judgment in Salduz have been uneven. This may be due 
 
 108.  See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 
11, at art. 46, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 109.  See infra Part III.B.3. 
 110.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 111.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
 112.  See generally supra note 46. 
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to the lack of consequences with any real bite for member states that refuse 
to comply with the ECtHR’s judgments. Moreover, the determination that 
counsel must be provided in the pretrial phase does not pose the most 
difficult task for courts. The Strasbourg system has not yet faced the even 
more difficult task of determining whether counsel, if provided, is adequate. 
A.  The Convention’s Original Enforcement Mechanism 
The initial Convention provided only a skeletal framework for the 
enforcement of the ECtHR’s judgments. Article 46 committed all 
contracting states to “abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to 
which they are parties,” and stated that the final judgment of the ECtHR 
“shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise 
its execution.”113 The CoM is made up of the foreign ministers of all member 
states (or their permanent representatives). In practice, the foreign ministers 
quickly delegated this supervisory authority. In May 1951 the Committee 
invited each state to appoint a permanent representative who would reside in 
Strasbourg, and in 1952 the Committee decided that each minister could 
appoint a deputy with the same decision-making powers as the minister. The 
deputy usually serves as a state’s permanent representative.114 
Prior to 1998, the CoM had only four methods of enforcement at its 
disposal if a member state appeared unwilling or unable to comply with a 
ECtHR judgment: applying diplomatic pressure, issuing “interim 
resolutions” encouraging states to comply, publishing press releases 
highlighting compliance issues, and expelling the offending member state 
from the Council of Europe.115 The first three methods were not always 
effective in ensuring compliance, and the last was so extreme that it has only 
been used once, and then in response to a military takeover, not an ECtHR 
compliance issue.116 
B.  The Convention’s Current Enforcement Regime 
The original bare-bones provisions of the Convention have been 
supplemented by amendments to the Convention, a variety of new 
 
 113.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 11, at 
art. 46, ¶¶ 1–2.  
 114.  See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, About the Committee of Ministers (2016), 
http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutCM_en.asp [https://perma.cc/7MS7-UFBK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
 115.  Déborah Forst, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Limits 
and Ways Ahead, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 1, 3, 14–15 (2013). 
 116.  Greece was on the verge of being expelled from the Council in 1967, after a military junta took 
control of the government. But at the last minute, the junta itself withdrew Greece from the Council. See 
B. VIVEKANANDAN, INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 123 (1997). 
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administrative measures (“working methods”), new judicial processes, and 
actions by other organs of the Council. 
1.  Amendments to the Convention 
Amendments to the Convention made the Court’s jurisdiction 
mandatory and gave the CoM additional enforcement options. Protocol 11,117 
which entered into force in 1998, allowed individuals to apply directly to the 
Court when they believed their rights had been violated by member states 
and made acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction mandatory for all member 
states.118 Protocol 14, which entered into force in 2010,119 made two changes 
in Article 46. First, if the CoM determines that uncertainty regarding the 
meaning of a judgment is hindering its enforcement, it can seek an 
interpretation of the ruling from the ECtHR.120 This change is intended to 
resolve deadlocks when the Court’s jurisprudence is unclear.121 Second, in a 
case in which the CoM believes a state is refusing to abide by a judgment to 
which it is a party, the CoM can refer to the Court the question whether the 
state has failed to fulfill its obligation.122 This provision is intended to be 
applied in exceptional circumstances when the respondent state and the CoM 
have failed to reach agreement on adequate measures, or the respondent state 
 
 117.  Protocols to the Convention are similar in some respects to amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
in that they may revise, supplement, or redefine sections of the original document’s text. Just as 
amendments must be ratified by states, the protocols are similarly ratified as separate treaties by member 
states. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 3 (2014), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5KN-5L7U]. Protocol 11 
has been signed and ratified by all forty-seven member states. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications 
of Treaty 155 – Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2016), http://www.coe.int/en/web/ 
conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/155/signatures?p_auth=9vH3s4r1 
[https://perma.cc/V9T9-7WKJ] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
 118.  See generally Ed Bates, The UK and Strasbourg: A Strained Relationship—The Long View, 12 
UNIV. OF LEISCESTER SCH. OF LAW. No. 15-05 (2015) (describing the opposition to this change in the 
United Kingdom). 
 119.  All forty-seven member states have signed and ratified this protocol. See Chart of Signatures 
and Ratifications of Treaty 194 – Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2016), http://www.coe.int/ 
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/194/signatures?p_auth=NKH3Mvl2 
[https://perma.cc/24J2-9JQ8] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
 120.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 11, at 
art. 46, ¶ 3. 
 121.  Forst, supra note 115, at 15. 
 122.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 11, at 
art. 46, ¶ 4. Referral to the Court under art. 46, ¶ 4, by itself, has no consequences other than a possible 
finding of the Court that the State has failed to comply, under art. 46, ¶ 5. The case is then referred back 
to the Committee of Ministers “for consideration of the measures to be taken.” The Convention does not 
indicate what those measures might be. That is where the administrative procedures, discussed in Part 
III.B.2, come into play. 
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is unable (or unwilling) to take the necessary measures. It therefore fills a 
gap between what one author has called “the soft (interim resolutions) and 
nuclear (expulsion from the Council of Europe) means at the disposal of the 
Committee of Ministers.”123 The changes were intended to have a deterrent 
effect on the states and to increase the legitimacy at the national level of 
necessary but unpopular measures, such as budgetary allocations.124 Actions 
by the CoM could give national lawmakers an incentive to adequately fund 
counsel for indigent defendants, even in the absence of strong public support 
for such a program. 
2.  Administrative Procedures 
Many administrative measures have been implemented to streamline 
the Court’s processes and to provide greater oversight of states’ execution of 
judgments. The CoM holds four Human Rights meetings a year, and day-to-
day supervision is in the hands of the Deputies, who meet weekly, and 
receive assistance from the CoM Secretariat. 
In 2010, the Deputies instructed the Secretariat to prepare detailed plans 
for a twin-track approach to continuous supervision.125 Under the new 
system, all cases are considered under the standard procedure, unless specific 
factors warrant the enhanced procedure.126 Factors calling for the enhanced 
procedure include judgments requiring urgent individual measures, “pilot 
judgments,”127 and “judgments raising structural and/or complex problems 
as identified by the Court or by the Committee of Ministers.”128 
When the ECtHR has found a violation by a member state, that state is 
required to go through a supervised process to prevent similar violations in 
the future. In cases falling under the “standard” procedures, member states 
that are found to be in violation of the Convention are expected to present an 
“action plan” or a series of action plans.129 Action plans detail the steps the 
state intends to take to implement a judgment by individual measures 
 
 123.  Forst, supra note 115, at 16. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DEPARTMENT FOR THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERLAKEN ACTION PLAN—
MODALITIES FOR A TWIN-TRACK SUPERVISION SYSTEM, Doc. No. CM/Inf/DH (2010) 37, at 2 (Sept. 6, 
2010), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0 
9000016804a327f [hereinafter SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION].  
 126.  Id. For data on the classification of the cases under the supervision of the CoM in 2015, see 
EUR. COMM. OF MINISTERS, 9TH ANNUAL REPORT:SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND 
DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 58–61 (2015).  
 127.  See infra Part III.B.3(a). 
 128.  SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125. 
 129.  Id. at 3. 
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affecting the case at bar and more general measures, no later than six months 
after a judgment becomes final.130 The Secretariat reviews and assesses all 
proposed action plans.131 Member states then produce an “action report” 
when they believe all necessary measures have been taken.132 If the state and 
the Secretariat agree that the measures adopted or implemented are 
satisfactory, then the Secretariat will propose that the Committee adopt a 
final resolution closing the case at the next Human Rights meeting of the 
CoM.133 
For cases falling under the “enhanced” procedures, the Secretariat 
assumes a “more intensive and proactive” role.134 It may assist in the 
preparation or implementation of action plans, provide expertise, and 
develop bilateral or multilateral cooperation programs to address complex 
and substantive issues.135 A standard timetable is provided, and the new 
procedures also deal with the failure of a state to present an action plan or 
report, and for the resolution of disagreements between the member state and 
the Secretariat.136 
Thus, while U.S. courts will generally take no action beyond reversing 
an individual conviction, in Europe, the CoM and the other agencies of the 
Council of Europe have asserted the authority to announce that systemic 
changes are required, to monitor progress, and to reward compliance. When 
necessary, they can also become closely involved in developing solutions 
and ensuring that rights are respected. 
3.  Judicial Enforcement 
Although the ECtHR initially had a “modest conception of its remedial 
powers,” in recent years the Court has expanded its orders to include not only 
specific remedies for the individual claimant, but also more general remedies 
to prevent future violations.137 To prevent similar violations in the future, 
states may be required to repeal or revise offending legislation, modify 
jurisprudence, or enact “practical measures” such as the building of new 
prisons, the appointment of more judges, or the modifications of budgetary 
 
 130.  SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125. 
 131.  Id. at 3–4.  
 132.  Id. at 4. 
 133.  SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125. 
 134.  Id. at 5. 
 135.  SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125. 
 136.  Id. at 6–7. 
 137.  Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a 
Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 146–47 
(2008); see also Forst, supra note 115, at 3–10. 
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arrangements.138 Surveying thirty-one decisions involving sixteen nations 
between 2013 and 2014, the Open Society Justice Initiative found twenty-
seven ECtHR-ordered “general measures.”139 These included ordering states 
to reform their system of judicial discipline, implement reforms in legislation 
and administrative practices, set specific time limits, and introduce, as soon 
as possible, a specific and clearly regulated compensatory remedy. Five 
decisions were pilot judgments and four directed the CoM to take further 
action.140 The ECtHR’s most significant procedural development is the pilot 
judgment system. 
a.  Pilot Judgments 
In response to a growing number of repetitive cases from the same 
member states, which contributed to backlogs and delays, the Court 
introduced the system of pilot judgments.141 This system has been 
incorporated in the Court’s rules, but not into the Convention. Under the pilot 
judgment procedure, the Court identifies the cause of systemic violations 
giving rise to many similar cases in a given state. The Court then suspends 
examination of the repetitive judgments while supervising general measures 
intended to correct the deficiency giving rise to the cases. The pilot case is 
subject to the aforementioned enhanced procedures, and respondent states 
remain responsible for identifying measures to implement the judgment. 
This procedure has been used with some success in a few cases and variants 
have also been employed in a larger number of cases.142 The new procedure 
has been described as an “important weapon” and a “shift away from the 
individualized-justice notion” that puts the Court in a “potentially more 
dynamic, ‘constitutional’ role.”143 But the pilot judgment procedure has also 
been criticized as exceeding the authority conferred by the Convention and 
interfering with the latitude states should have to implement the Court’s 
judgments.144 Although there is no system of sanctions for non-
 
 138.  Forst, supra note 115, at 9–10. 
 139.  OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT REMEDIES DECISIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (June 2015), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/case-
digests-echr-remedies-2013-2014-20150708.pdf [https://perma.cc/U25C-MUXM]. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM 
ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 490–91 (2010) 
(describing the pilot system); Forst, supra note 115, at 19. The seminal case was Broniowski v. Poland, 
2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 3. 
 142.  BATES, supra note 141, at 491. 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Forst, supra note 115, at 20 (citing PHILIP LEACH ET AL., RESPONDING TO SYSTEMATIC HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF ‘PILOT JUDGMENTS’ OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THEIR IMPACT AT NATIONAL LEVEL 29 (2010)); Markus Fyrnys, Expanding Competences 
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implementation of pilot judgments, the Court retains the authority to 
unfreeze all of the similar cases if no satisfactory solution is adopted.145 
b.  Other Judicial Techniques 
In a number of cases the Court has shown an increasing willingness to 
use its judgments to condemn a state when a new violation results from the 
state’s failure to implement a previous judgment of the Court and to call on 
national courts to implement its jurisprudence. Thus in Greens and M.T. v. 
U.K.146 the Court expressly stated that the new violation originated in the 
failure of the UK to execute an earlier judgment in Hirst v. U.K. (No. 2).147 
Decisions of this nature contrast with the Court’s earlier statements that it 
would not control in a second judgment how a state had implemented an 
earlier judgment.148 The Court has also pointed out that domestic courts are 
obligated to give effect to Convention standards as interpreted by the Court 
itself.149 
4.  Actions by Other Institutions of the Council of Europe 
Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Commissioner for Human 
Rights have also undertaken activities intended to help implement the 
Court’s judgments. “Since 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly has engaged 
in a monitoring procedure for the execution of judgments,” with the idea that 
delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly should put pressure on national 
powers to execute the Court’s judgments.150 The Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Commission for Legal Affairs and Human Rights produces reports, and it 
drafts both resolutions for the Assembly and questions for the CoM. The 
Commissioner for Human Rights also participates in these activities. 
Additionally, under Protocol 14 the Commissioner can intervene in cases 
before the CoM as a third party, and he has done so.151 
5.  Pushback: Challenges to the ECtHR’s Legitimacy 
The changes in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and procedures have been 
controversial. In the Brighton Declaration in 2012, all member states called 
 
by the Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, 12 
GERMAN L.J. 1231, 1249 (2011). 
 145.  Forst, supra note 115, at 21. 
 146.  Greens and M.T. v. U.K., 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57. 
 147.  Hirst v. U.K. (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187. 
 148.  See Mehemi v. France (No. 2), 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 311. 
 149.  See Forst, supra note 115, at 22. 
 150.  Id. at 23. 
 151.  See id. at 24. 
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for significant reforms,152 and scholars have raised a variety of concerns 
about the Court. Although a full description of the criticism of the ECtHR is 
beyond the scope of this article, we note briefly some key points. First, some 
critics suggest that the Court has given insufficient weight to state 
sovereignty.153 Second, they say the Court is not sufficiently attuned to the 
intricacies of the various national systems and issues orders that are both ill-
suited to those systems and beyond the Court’s power.154 Third, they say the 
Court lacks the institutional capacity to manage its own caseload.155 Finally, 
some critics question the competency of the Court’s judges.156 
C.  The European Union Directive 
As the Council of Europe has enhanced its enforcement mechanisms 
and expanded its role in protecting defendants’ rights, the European Union 
has independently pursued some of the same goals, providing a strong 
additional incentive for states to guarantee a right to counsel for defendants. 
In an effort to buttress the legitimacy of the European Arrest Warrant, which 
provides for the arrest and transfer of suspects throughout the European 
Union, the EU has endeavored to standardize the pre-trial rights afforded to 
suspects across the Continent. In 2009, it issued a resolution laying out a 
Roadmap with the purpose of “strengthen[ing] the rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings.”157 The Roadmap announced 
several unifying procedural measures and provided that nations would have 
 
 152.  See Madsen, supra note 36, at 144. 
 153.  Madsen, supra note 36, at 144 (“With the Court increasingly overburdened and backlogged—
yet still progressively expanding the scope of the Convention—a number of member states launched, for 
the first time since the Court’s creation in 1959, a systematic critique of both the Court’s power over 
national law and politics and the quality of the Court’s judges and their judgments.”); see also JONAS 
CHRISTOFFERSON & MIKAEL R. MADSEN, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present and Future of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND 
POLITICS 230, 239 (2013); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, BRIGHTON DECLARATION (Apr. 20, 2012). See 
particularly Part B, Interaction Between the Court and National Authorities, calling for increased attention 
to the margin of appreciation and the subsidiarity of the Convention system to national courts; Part D, 
Processing of Applications, noting the backlog of the Court; and Part E, Judges and Jurisprudence of the 
Court (“The authority and credibility of the Court depend in large part on the quality of its judges and the 
judgments they deliver.”). 
 154.  See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 36, at 165 (“The response from French judges was that the ECtHR 
simply failed to grasp the complexity of French justice in the Court’s pursuit of a superficial and formalist 
attempt to set uniform European standards.”). 
 155.  See id. at 172–73. 
 156.  Madsen, supra note 36, at 169 (“[T]he 2012 Brighton Summit further underscored that the 
power of the ECtHR was no longer beyond political debate . . . [I]t openly raised the political question of 
the future role of the Court with a series of negative comments on the quality of the judges and their 
judgments.”) (citing Brighton Declaration, ¶¶ 23 and 25c (Apr. 20, 2012)). 
 157.  Council Resolution 295/01 of Nov. 30, 2009, on a Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural 
Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings, 2009 O.J. (C 295) 1. 
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three years to comply with any attendant directives. Thus far, three directives 
have been issued relating to interpretation and translation (2010),158 the right 
to information in criminal proceedings (2012),159 and the right of access to a 
lawyer (2013).160 The 2013 directive mandates that suspects have access to 
a lawyer, including during police questioning, and that the lawyer be able “to 
be present and participate effectively” during questioning.161 
Although the Roadmap directives were issued independently of the 
Convention and the ECtHR,162 they place additional pressure to comply with 
the Convention’s pre-trial counsel requirement on countries that are 
members of both the Council of Europe and the European Union. There is 
evidence that this pressure has already had an impact in countries that were 
reluctant to act on the basis of Salduz alone. In France, the reforms that 
followed Salduz allowed attorneys to be present at questioning, but not to 
speak or to examine the most important documents relating to suspects’ 
arrests.163 Despite French attorneys’ protests that these restrictions were 
inconsistent with Salduz, French courts approved the reforms several times. 
But after the EU issued its 2013 directive on the right to information in a 
criminal proceeding, the attorneys revived their protests, arguing that Article 
7 of the directive established their right to access a suspect’s entire file. As a 
result, France’s implementing law, which was eventually passed in 2014, 
“was under the microscope before it was even promulgated.”164 And while 
the implementing law did not go as far in opening up suspects’ files as many 
in France desired, the law did slightly expand the information that must be 
made available to attorneys.165 
 
 158.  Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on 
the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings, 2010 O.J. (L 280) 1. 
 159.  Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the 
Right to Information in Criminal Proceedings, 2012 O.J. (L 142) 1. 
 160.  Directive 2013/48/EU, supra note 46. 
 161.  Directive 2013/48/EU, supra note 46, at art. 3, ¶¶ 1–3. 
 162.  Although the EU and the ECtHR are independent bodies, the directive does refer, explicitly and 
approvingly, to the ECtHR’s work on pre-trial rights, stating that it is “building upon Articles 3, 5, 6 and 
8” of the Convention and that the ECtHR’s case-law “sets standards on the right of access to a lawyer.” 
Directive 2013/48/EU, supra note 46, at ¶ 12. 
 163.  Jessica Finelle & Alex Tinsley, Access to the Criminal Case File: French Example Shows 
Potential Impact of Roadmap Directives, EUTOPIA LAW (June 3, 2014), 
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/06/03/access-to-the-criminal-case-file-french-example-shows-potential-
impact-of-roadmap-directives [https://perma.cc/MC89-ZF2P]. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
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D.  Evaluating the Implementation of ECtHR Decisions 
To evaluate the success of these mechanisms in implementing the right 
to counsel decision in Salduz, and more generally, we need to ask several 
questions. First, did the state party to the case comply with the judgment? 
And what does compliance entail? Do other states comply with the decisions 
of the ECtHR? We find a mixed picture. Although Turkey adopted corrective 
legislation, it is unclear whether it fully addresses the issues. Several other 
member states have taken actions to implement Salduz, but the measures they 
have adopted may not guarantee a right as robust as that envisioned by the 
ECtHR. Finally, member states that do not respond may face no real 
consequences. 
1.  Compliance with Salduz in Turkey 
One measure of success focuses on the individual applicant, and 
perhaps other similarly situated applicants from the same member state 
Despite the adoption of corrective legislation in Turkey and sustained 
attention from the ECtHR and the CoM, it remains unclear whether the 
general problems brought to light in Salduz have been satisfactorily 
addressed. The Salduz case was not an isolated incident. An anti-terror law 
had denied the minor applicant the assistance of counsel during his 
interrogation, and additional Turkish cases came to the ECtHR after Salduz 
revealing systematic violations of the right to counsel. The ECtHR ordered 
relief in these cases as well,166 and for purposes of implementation by the 
CoM, these cases have been treated as a group. Turkey adopted legislative 
changes repealing the law that had denied counsel to the applicant in Salduz 
and providing more generally for pretrial assistance of counsel.167 The 
Turkish government argued that this satisfied its obligations. However, the 
Salduz group of cases remained under the supervision of the CoM. In 2012 
and 2013, non-government organizations (“NGO”s) filed requests that the 
cases be subject to enhanced supervision and that the Turkish Government 
be required to provide additional information and undertake additional 
activities.168 The NGOs noted that although Salduz had eventually been 
 
 166.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACTSHEET—POLICE ARREST AND ASSISTANCE OF A 
LAWYER (Apr. 2015) (on file with author) (citing Turkish cases involving both juveniles and adults from 
2009 and 2010 in which damages were awarded). 
 167.  For a detailed description of the additional cases and the measures taken by Turkey, see Kerem 
Altıparmak, Implementation of the Judgment of Salduz/Turkey: Monitoring Report, HUMAN RIGHTS 
JOINT PLATFORM (Ayşegül Bahçıvan trans., July 2013), http://www.aihmiz.org.tr/files/06_ 
Salduz_Report_EN.pdf. 
 168.  Id. at 8 (making recommendations and noting earlier Open Society Institute Justice Initiative’s 
request that the Salduz cases be given enhanced supervision). 
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granted a retrial,169 other defendants were not retried due to various 
procedural issues, and in general the percentage of cases in which counsel 
was actually provided was extremely low.170 
2.  Compliance with Salduz in Other Member States 
Another measure of success is the implementation of ECtHR decisions 
by other states. Again, the picture is mixed. A case brief for the Open Society 
Justice Initiative expressed optimism in 2011, describing a “Salduz Fever 
Sweep[ing] Europe” and stating that the Salduz reforms “are finally taking 
hold.”171 National courts and prosecutorial authorities have taken action to 
implement Salduz. In Belgium, where Attorneys General and the police 
originally resisted efforts to provide indigent defendants with attorneys 
during interrogations, the legislature passed the so-called “Salduz bill,” 
which gave defendants the right to an attorney at the initial stages of police 
proceedings. Scotland initially seemed resistant to the idea of implementing 
the ECtHR’s judgment, but after being “slammed” by the UK Supreme 
Court, it passed emergency legislation guaranteeing the right to counsel.172 
France’s Cour de Cassation ruled that the ECtHR’s decision in Salduz 
required legislation allowing attorneys to be present during interrogations to 
go into effect immediately.173 
However, it is important to note that the legislation other states passed 
in response to Salduz did not necessarily guarantee a right to counsel as 
robust as the one the ECtHR might have envisioned. In France, as discussed 
above, post-Salduz legislation gave attorneys the right to be present at 
interrogations but not to ask questions or see documents related to the 
suspect’s arrest.174 In Scotland, suspects may now consult a state-paid 
attorney prior to interrogation, but the vast majority of such consultations 
take place over the phone, without the attorney ever coming to the station 
 
 169.  In Salduz, four judges concurred to express concern about the relief to be afforded. Although 
paragraph 72 of the ECtHR’s judgment stated that the “most appropriate form of redress for a violation 
of Article 6 § 1 would be to ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is put in the position in which he 
would have been had this provision not been disregarded,” the concurring judges expressed concern that 
this statement was not included in the operative portion of the judgment, which ordered Turkey to pay 
the applicant €2,000 in damages and €1,000 in costs. Salduz v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 59, 81, 85–
88. 
 170.  It is estimated that only 10 percent of criminal defendants in Turkey exercise their right to legal 
assistance. See Altıparmak, supra note 167, at 12.  
 171.  Marion Isobel, Case Watch: Salduz Fever Sweeps Europe, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (Apr. 
26, 2011), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/case-watch-salduz-fever-sweeps-europe 
[https://perma.cc/G5SF-53V4]. 
 172.  See Ed Cape & Jacqueline Hodgson, The Right to Access to a Lawyer at Police Stations: 
Making the European Directive Work in Practice, 5 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 450, 453 (2014). 
 173.  Id. at 453–54. 
 174.  See Finelle & Tinsley, supra note 163. 
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house.175 In France and the Netherlands, attorneys are limited to thirty-
minute consultations with suspects before interrogations begin.176 
It is uncertain whether these limited extensions of the right to counsel 
will be deemed sufficient by the ECtHR. Even if they are deemed 
insufficient, it is unclear what consequences, if any, will await states that do 
not comply with the Court’s judgments. Ultimately, implementation of the 
ECtHR’s judgments relies on what Ed Bates calls “the political ‘peer’ 
pressure that the Committee [of Ministers], and so the Convention system 
more generally, may exert.”177 In effect, the Strasbourg system depends on 
“the good will and cooperation of the States themselves.”178 
There appear to be limits to what good will and peer pressure can 
accomplish. The UK, for example, has steadfastly refused to comply with an 
ECtHR ruling that convicted prisoners may not be disenfranchised.179 
Despite the enforcement mechanisms described above, to date there have 
been no real consequences for this refusal. Indeed, instead of the Council of 
Europe threatening to expel the UK from the European body, leaders in the 
UK who are concerned about national sovereignty and democratic control 
have called for the UK to withdraw from the Convention and the jurisdiction 
of the ECtHR.180 
The UK’s experience indicates that states that have not responded to 
Salduz by guaranteeing a meaningful right to counsel during interrogation 
may never face real consequences for their failure to comply. Thus, despite 
the many layers of “enforcement” developed by the Council of Europe, the 
lack of stiff penalties for states that don’t comply with ECtHR judgments 
may render the Council incapable of ensuring that every European defendant 
has access to an attorney during interrogation. 
3.  The Limitations of the Strasbourg System 
Although it appears that the Strasbourg system has advantages over the 
U.S. system, it is unclear whether its advantages are sufficient to support the 
emergence of a fully-matured right to counsel. The Strasbourg supervisory 
system certainly has some elements that are lacking in the U.S. system. For 
 
 175.  See Cape & Hodgson, supra note 172, at 462. 
 176.  See id. 
 177.  BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 141, 
at 493. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See Bates, THE UK AND STRASBOURG: A STRAINED RELATIONSHIP, supra note 118, at 1–2. 
 180. See Nicholas Watt & Owen Bowcott, Tories Plan to Withdraw UK from European Convention 
on Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 
2014/oct/03/tories-plan-uk-withdrawal-european-convention-on-human-rights [https://perma.cc/FPK7-
9X87]. 
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example, the Strasbourg system has developed an administrative and judicial 
regime for ordering general remedies and supervising their implementation. 
But the Strasbourg system has not yet demonstrated that it can ensure that 
counsel will be provided in member states at all designated stages of a 
criminal case. And it has not undertaken or been tested in cases involving the 
more nuanced question whether counsel was adequate. Moreover, there are 
danger signals on the horizon. Even with its new administrative procedures, 
the Court’s caseload is unmanageable,181 the rates of compliance with its 
decisions appear to be declining,182 the Court’s legitimacy has been seriously 
challenged, and a few member states are seriously considering whether to 
exit.183 
CONCLUSION 
Both the U.S. and Strasbourg systems charge a high court with defining 
and enforcing the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. But there are 
major differences in the founding documents, institutional design, and 
historical development of the right to counsel in the two systems. Each 
system has distinctive advantages and limitations. 
The more recent and specialized Strasbourg system has several 
advantages that hold promise for enforcing a robust right to counsel for 
indigent defendants. First, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Strasbourg 
system was designed to implement human rights, including the right to 
counsel. The European Convention on Human Rights explicitly stated the 
right to state-funded counsel, created a court to interpret and enforce that 
right (as well as others created by the Convention), and provided a 
framework for the enforcement of the court’s judgments. Member states 
voluntarily accepted the mandate to fund the right to counsel under the 
supervision of the ECtHR. Second, the delegation of enforcement authority 
to the CoM provides political and diplomatic mechanisms to induce member 
states to comply with ECtHR judgments. Third, the CoM and Secretariat 
have developed a system of administrative procedures that bring pressure to 
bear on recalcitrant member states. Finally, ECtHR judgments now 
frequently order member states to develop general remedies as well as 
remedies for the individual party before it, and these general remedies are 
subject to administrative follow-up by the Secretariat and the CoM. 
 
 181.  For the most recent caseload statistics and a discussion of their implications, see EUR. CT. H.R., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (provisional version) 65 (69,900 applications pending at the end of 2014); 
Madsen, supra note 36, at 177–78.  
 182.  See Madsen, supra note 36, at 172. 
 183.  See id. at 170–73 (discussing Russia and UK). 
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But the ECtHR’s structure also imposes significant limitations. First, 
the Convention created only a single court, with no possibility of adding 
lower human rights courts. A European defendant must bring his case in 
Strasbourg, where the ECtHR—even after the adoption of reforms such as 
the pilot judgment system—remains encumbered by an enormous caseload 
and backlog. Moreover, each case is brought as a complaint against a 
particular member state, not as a challenge to the legality of the defendant’s 
conviction or detention. The ECtHR can declare that an individual’s rights 
were violated, it can order the member state to compensate him, and it can 
declare that the most effective relief would be retrial. But the ECtHR cannot 
itself reverse the individual’s conviction or order his release. The Convention 
itself provides no procedure for seeking class-wide relief184 or structural 
reform, and serious questions have been raised about the legitimacy of the 
ECtHR’s requirement that member states adopt general remedies subject to 
the oversight of the Secretariat and CoM. Perhaps it is not surprising that the 
rate of compliance with ECtHR judgments has declined. And finally, at the 
end of the day, if bureaucratic, political, and diplomatic pressures are 
insufficient to bring about compliance with an ECtHR judgment, there is no 
remedy other than expulsion of a recalcitrant member state that refuses to 
comply with either a general or a specific remedy. 
The U.S. system has very different advantages and limitations. It was 
not originally designed for this purpose, but the U.S. constitutional system 
evolved, over time, to provide a basis for judicial decisions creating and 
enforcing individual rights, including the right to counsel, in state 
prosecutions. The original constitutional design contained two features—
neither of which is present in the Strasbourg system—that later proved to be 
critical to the enforcement of individual rights in state criminal prosecutions: 
congressional authority to create lower federal courts and judicial authority 
to issue writs of habeas corpus. The Constitution was twice amended, first 
by the Bill of Rights, which recognized a narrow right to counsel applicable 
in federal cases, and later, by the Civil War amendments, which required 
Due Process in state proceedings. Eventually, the Supreme Court held that 
Due Process includes the right to state-compensated counsel. Taken together, 
these developments created a system that affords significant advantages to 
individual defendants. Unlike a defendant in a European country, who must 
 
 184.  For a discussion of the ECtHR’s lack of a class action mechanism and the limitations of the 
pilot-judgment mechanism as a substitute, see generally Tatiana Sainati, Human Rights Class Actions: 
Rethinking the Pilot-Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
147 (2015). Sainati observes that “the legal basis for the pilot-judgment procedure remains contested; the 
rules and procedures governing the pilot-judgment mechanism lack clarity and predictability; and . . . 
[they lack the] procedural safeguards necessary” to protect individual rights. Id. at 149–50. 
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bring a case in Strasbourg, an individual defendant in the United States has 
two options. He may seek review of a state conviction by the Supreme Court 
as the final step in the appellate process in his original criminal case, though 
such review is granted in only a tiny fraction of cases. But an individual 
defendant can also challenge his state conviction by bringing a habeas action 
in the local federal district court where he is incarcerated. Those courts can 
order the relief that an individual most values, reversing his conviction or 
ordering his retrial or release. In addition, the federal courts also have 
jurisdiction to entertain class actions and actions seeking injunctive relief. 
Unfortunately, the structural advantages of the U.S. system have been 
largely nullified by judicial decisions that have narrowed the scope of habeas 
review, restricted institutional reform litigation, and failed to put any teeth 
in the definition of constitutionally adequate representation. The lower 
federal courts provide a forum for constitutional litigation, but neither habeas 
nor structural reform litigation has been able to make a federal right to the 
effective assistance of counsel a reality in state prosecutions. The U.S. 
Constitution does not guarantee a truly effective right to counsel in state 
proceedings. 
At a sufficient level of abstraction, the commitment to the right to 
counsel seems easy to make, and easy to defend. Trials involve complex 
procedural matters, making it nearly impossible for defendants to adequately 
represent themselves. In order to provide a fair and just trial, each criminal 
defendant should have a lawyer, even if he or she is too poor to pay for one. 
Those lawyers should protect the fundamental rights of all citizens and 
prevent wrongful convictions, but should not unduly interfere with the 
accurate determination of guilt. But in practice, questions arise that are 
harder to answer. Defense lawyers are expensive, in treasure, time, and the 
potential for lost convictions of the factually guilty. They are therefore 
politically controversial. Moreover, determining how these rights are best 
implemented across varied jurisdictions is difficult for appellate courts. 
Under both the Constitution and the Convention a central court bears 
the responsibility of ensuring that the right to counsel is honored. Neither 
system has fully answered the difficult questions of detail. For example, the 
binary question—did you have a lawyer?—is more readily susceptible to 
judicial decision making by a central reviewing court than are the more 
complex questions—was a lawyer necessary at a particular stage for the 
decision to be fair or reliable, and was the particular lawyer you actually got 
effective under the circumstances? And neither system has demonstrated that 
the judiciary can create money or political will. Like many difficult political 
problems, defining and enforcing the right to counsel has been resistant to a 
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variety of solutions. In both systems, therefore, the evolution of the right 
remains a work in progress. 
 
